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NOTES
DEFENDANT'S DISCRIMINATORY USE
OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
AFTER BATSON v. KENTUCKY
The practice of permitting a party, by use of the peremptory
challenge,1 to exclude from a petit jury2 those veniremen suspected
of undue partiality is widespread,3 long-standing,4 and increasingly
I A peremptory challenge has been defined as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without
assigning a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979). It is "an
arbitrary and capricious species of challenge," 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353, and
may generally be exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)). In contrast are challenges for cause, which must be
approved by the trial judge, and are so approved only "on a narrowly specified, provable and
legally cognizable basis of partiality." Id. The number of peremptory challenges allowed is
fixed by statute, see infra note 3, but the number of challenges for cause allowed is unlim-
ited. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REP-
RESENTATIVE PANELS 140 (1977). Although each type of challenge is allowed in both civil and
criminal actions, see id. at app. D., the focus in this Note will be upon the use of the pe-
remptory challenge in criminal trials. For a discussion of recent developments in civil ac-
tions, see Comment, Vitiation of Peremptory Challenge in Civil Actions: Clark v. City of
Bridgeport, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 155 (1986).
2 The petit jury is "[t]he ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action,"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979), and is to be distinguished from the grand jury,
whose function is to determine "whether probable cause exists that a crime has been com-
mitted and whether an indictment (true bill) should be returned against one for such a
crime." Id.
There are three distinct stages in the selection of the petit jury. See J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 1, at 85-175. The first stage consists of the compilation of a list of eligible jurors and
the random selection from that list of a venire to serve for a particular term. See id. at 85-
86. The second stage of selection involves the granting of excuses to those selected for the
venire. See id. at 111. Finally, the third stage consists of for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges to those sitting on the venire. See id. at 139-40. This challenge stage is known as voir
dire. See id. at 140. For a discussion of various methods of conducting the voir dire exami-
nation, see Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545,
546-49 (1975).
1 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at app. D; Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 227 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
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controversial.5 Traditionally, two separate but related justifications
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges). All American jurisdictions statutorily provide for the
exercise of peremptories. See Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra, at 227-29.
The number of peremptories allowed each side varies widely according to both the crime
and the jurisdiction. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1988) (up to 20 pe-
remptory challenges for capital crimes and crimes punishable by life imprisonment) and
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1982) (up to 20 peremptory challenges for class A
felonies) with VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1983) (only four peremptory challenges for capital
crimes and felonies). For lesser crimes, the disparity among jurisdictions is considerably
smaller. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at app. D. The vast majority of states, for example,
allow between two and ten peremptory challenges in misdeameanor cases. Id.
4 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 212. Prior to 1305, the prosecution could exercise an unlimited
number of peremptory challenges. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 147. This allowed the
Crown to essentially handpick juries. See id. In response to the perceived injustice inherent
in such a system, Parliament enacted the Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, ch. 2, stat. 4
(1305), which prohibited entirely the prosecution's use of peremptories. See id. This statute
was interpreted, however, to allow the prosecution to "stand aside" jurors. See, e.g.,
Anonymus, [1726] 86 Eng. Rep. 199, 200 (K.B.) (holding "the King is not [required] to shew
any cause"); see generally Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a
Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV.
192, 193-94 (1978) (origins and judicial interpretation of 1305 Act). The right of standing
jurors aside, still the law in England, see The Queen v. Mason, [1980] 3 All E.R. 777, 783,
effectively operates as a right to exercise a type of tentative peremptory challenge, a chal-
lenge which becomes final if there is not a deficiency of jurors remaining after the defendant
has exercised his available peremptory challenges and both sides have exercised their chal-
lenges for cause. The Queen v. Geach, [1841] 173 Eng. Rep. 929, 930 (K.B.) See Swain, 380
U.S. at 213; see also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 148 (common-law history of challenges).
Because it has been extremely rare for a jury panel not to produce a sufficient number of
unchallenged jurors, the right to stand aside is best considered a de facto peremptory chal-
lenge. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 148.
In the United States, although the right of the defendant to challenge peremptorily has
always been accepted as part of the common law, the right of the prosecution to similarly
challenge, or even to stand jurors aside, has not been so widely accepted. See id.; Brown,
McGuire & Winters, supra, at 194-95. Regarding the right to stand aside, the Supreme
Court tacitly recognized a disparity among the states in 1855 when it held that in federal
courts, the prosecutor's right was dependent upon state law, and that if state law or usage
did not allow the prosecutor to stand jurors aside, the right "should be rejected." See
United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588, 590 (1855). Eventually, however, the
controversy in the United States surrounding the standing aside doctrine dissipated, as
states, by statute, began to expressly grant prosecutors the right to exercise peremptory
challenges. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 150.
5 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). In Bat-
son, Justice Marshall noted that: "[tihe inherent potential of peremptory challenges to dis-
tort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally
lead the Court to ban them entirely from the criminal justice system." Id. at 107 (Marshall,
J., concurring). See generally Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at
244-56 (arguing for abolishment of all peremptory challenges).
Although such calls for eliminating the use of peremptory challenges remain rare, see
Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at 244 n.87 and accompanying text,
the controversy surrounding peremptories is not limited to the question of whether to main-
tain the challenge or completely eliminate it. See infra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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have been advanced in support of such challenges." First, it has
been asserted that peremptory challenges are the most effective
means of removing "extremes of partiality" from the jury, thereby
ensuring that the jury ultimately selected will be as impartial as is
practicable.' Second, even if a party does not make optimum use of
available peremptory challenges, the mere exercise of the right at
least satisfies the appearance of justice by assuring each party and
the public that the jurors selected will not prejudge the case, but
will instead deliberate solely "on the basis of the evidence placed
before them."8 Notwithstanding the strength of these policy con-
siderations, the Supreme Court has noted emphatically and repeat-
e See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (peremptory challenges eliminate partiality and as-
sure parties of same); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 356-57 (1982) (goal of peremp-
tory challenges to provide impartiality and appearance of impartiality); infra notes 7 & 8
and accompanying text (discussion of traditional justifications).
7 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 218-19. It has been noted that the challenge system has an
inherent deterrent against abuse because "a party who insists on challenging jurors on the
basis of questionable stereotypes increases his chances of removing friendly jurors and de-
creases his opportunities for excluding more biased veniremen, thus reducing the possibility
of success at trial." Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 6, at 365.
Although parties have the same self-interest in effectively exercising challenges for
cause to remove partial jurors, for several reasons such challenges cannot be expected to be
utilized with complete effectiveness:
First, jurors may be reluctant to admit their prejudices before spectators or others
present in the courtroom during the voir dire. Second, certain prospective jurors
may evade full disclosure of their prejudices in an effort to avoid being struck
from the jury. Finally, other prospective jurors may simply be unaware of the exis-
tence of certain biases or prejudices they may harbor.
People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 547, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
Thus, peremptory challenges increase jury impartiality by eliminating biases that, for
one reason or another, were not or could not be satisfactorily proven. See Swain, 380 U.S. at
219-20; McCray, 57 N.Y.2d at 547-48, 443 N.E.2d at 918, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 444. But see Note,
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at 271 (by expanding voir dire and ques-
tioning potential jurors privately, challenge for cause could by itself be as effective in remov-
ing biased jurors as is current system of striking jurors both for cause and peremptorily).
' See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. The Swain Court noted that "to perform its high function
in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'" Id. (quoting In re Murchi-
son, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to assert that it is
"necessary... that a prisoner.., should have a good opinion of his jury... [for] the law
wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice
even without being able to assign a reason for his dislike." Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 376 (1892). See also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353 (allowing peremptory chal-
lenges to be exercised to exclude potential jurors based on nothing more than the challenged
jurors "bare looks and gestures" justified by concern for the defendant's state of mind). The
importance of this rationale decreases, however, to the degree its application conflicts with
the community's sense of fairness. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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edly that the use of the peremptory challenge is not a constitu-
tional right.9 Thus, while peremptory challenges may generally be
viewed as an effective means of ensuring jury impartiality, 10 when
they are exercised in contravention of a specific constitutional pro-
vision, such effectiveness becomes irrelevant and the constitutional
mandate, by its nature, must prevail.1
Applying this principle, the Supreme Court, in Batson v. Ken-
tucky,12 proscribed the racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by prosecutors in criminal proceedings, holding that
such use violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment.'" The Court emphasized the jury's central position as
a protective barrier against the arbitrary exercise of power by the
state, and stated that to allow purposeful discrimination in jury
selection would endanger this protection."4 Batson, however, while
' See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (prosecutor's discriminatory use
of peremptory challenge not protected by Constitution); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (peremptory
challenge may be restricted since it does not arise from Constitution); Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (since peremptory challenge not constitutional right, multi-
ple defendants may be treated as one party in allotment of such).
The language in Stilson is unequivocal and often cited: "[tihere is nothing in the Con-
stitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges
to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured." Stilson, 250
U.S. at 586,
10 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219; United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d
541, 561 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1267 (1987). Indeed,
even courts that have limited the use of peremptory challenges have emphasized such chal-
lenge's general utility in ensuring impartiality. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass.
461, 485, 387 N.E.2d 499, 514 (retention of "a legitimate and significant role for the peremp-
tory challenge"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 530, 511
A.2d 1150, 1161 (1986) (peremptory challenge viable means of achieving jury impar-
tiality).
" See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (peremptory challenge may not be exercised in violation
of fourteenth amendment); Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (fourteenth amendment prohibits dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenge). The general principle of constitutional supremacy
noted here is of course beyond confutation. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176-77 (1803). "It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it." Id. at 176.
12 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13 Id. at 89. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, §1.
1N See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. Eleven years prior to Batson, in a case decided under the
sixth amendment, the Supreme Court stressed the same theme:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make
available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the
overzealous or mistaken prosecutor .... This prophylactic vehicle is not provided
if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large,
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:46
continuing a century-old trend toward increasing the representa-
tive nature of the jury,15 expressly left unresolved the question of
whether a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
might also be successfully challenged.' 6
Several state courts of last review, relying upon their respec-
tive state constitutions, have answered this question in the affirma-
distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citation omitted).
The discriminatory exclusion of certain groups from the jury by use of the peremptory
challenge will result in the failure of the jury to perform its protective role because such an
exclusion makes it unlikely the jury will express "the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity," since it is disproportionately composed of members of the preferred group. See
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 266-67, 583 P.2d 748, 754-55, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 896
(1978).
'5 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-85. The efforts of the Court to develop a more representa-
tive jury selection system began with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The
Strauder Court relied upon the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a state statute exclud-
ing blacks from juries. See id. at 309. The Strauder rationale was later extended to the
discriminatory administration by state officers of facially neutral laws delineating juror
qualifications. See Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357, 360 (1939). Development toward
increasing the representative nature of the jury continued in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954), in which the Court first recognized the unconstitutionality of non-race based
discrimination in jury selection by holding that citizens of Mexican descent could not be
systematically excluded from jury duty. Id. at 482. The Court has also applied a sixth
amendment analysis to find a juror selection system that resulted in disproportionate exclu-
sion of women from juries unconstitutional. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525.
All of the cases cited above, however (except Batson), dealt with eligibility for and se-
lection to the venire of an entire group, either blacks or women or Mexican-Americans.
Their relevance regarding the discriminatory exclusion of those already on the venire from
the petit jury is thus debatable, for exclusion from the venire differs from exclusion by
peremptory challenge in several important respects:
[Systematic exclusion from all venire pools] singles out the excluded group, while
individuals of all groups are equally subject to peremptory challenge on any basis,
including their group affiliation. Further, venire-pool exclusion bespeaks a priori
across-the-board total unfitness, while peremptory-strike exclusion merely sug-
gests potential partiality in a particular isolated case. Exclusion from venires fo-
cuses on the inherent attributes of the excluded group and infers its inferiority,
but the peremptory does not. To suggest that a particular race is unfit to judge in
any case necessarily is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may have its
own special concerns, or even may tend to favor its own, is not.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 122-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Leslie, 783
F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1267 (1987)
(emphasis in original)).
When the defendant's exercise of the peremptory is being challenged, the distinction
between venire and petit exclusion is particularly acute, as the Court in Batson impliedly
noted. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12.
"6 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. The Court stated, "[w]e express no views on whether
the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense
counsel." Id.
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tive, 17 and at least one trial court has expressly cited Batson as
authority for similarly limiting a defendant's discriminatory use. 8
Whether the federal Constitution, if properly construed, will yield
the same result as the several state constitutions is highly uncer-
tain, however. 19 Indeed, the extension of the Batson analysis to en-
compass defendant's use has been attacked as especially constitu-
tionally dubious.20
This Note will discuss the applicability of Batson's equal pro-
tection analysis to a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. Furthermore, this Note will examine whether, if the
equal protection analysis should be found wanting, an alternative
provision of the Constitution might be employed to prohibit such
discrimination. Additionally, public policy concerns relating to the
11 See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.29
(prosecution "entitled to a trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-
section of the community"); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984) (prosecution as
well as defense entitled to challenge discriminatory use of peremptories); Commonwealth v.
Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 254-56, 424 N.E.2d 495, 499-501 (1981) (within judge's discretion to
limit improper use of peremptory challenges by defendant). See also United States v. Leslie,
783 F.2d 541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("[E]very jurisdiction which has... prohibited
[discriminatory] prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges ... has held that the de-
fense must likewise be so prohibited"), vacated and remanded, 107 S. Ct. 1267 (1987).
10 See In re Ladone, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1987, at 3, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Queens County).
In Ladone, white defendants were charged with second-degree murder of a black man.
Id. The attack which led to the victim's death was racially motivated. Id. at 1, col. 3. During
voir dire, defendants sought to exercise their peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from
the jury. Id. Relying upon Batson, the trial court ordered defendants to give race-neutral
reasons for any further exclusion of black potential jurors. Id. at 3, col. 4. Defense attorneys
attacked the ruling as groundless, with the director of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys attributing it to the trial judge's "temporary loss of legal sanity." See
Cheever, Defense Jeers Ruling Denying Peremptories in Howard Beach, Manhattan Law.,
Oct. 6-12, 1987, at 5, col. 4; infra note 20. Presumably, any loss of faith suffered by the
director in the mental well-being of the judiciary was restored by the holding in Holtzman v.
Supreme Court, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1988, at 20, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County). In
Holtzman, the trial judge, Justice Rosato, rejected the applicability of the Batson analysis
to a defendant's discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 33, col. 1. Jus-
tice Rosato based his decision on the failure of the plaintiff to demonstrate "state action"
sufficient to implicate the fourteenth amendment. Id. After the ruling, the plaintiff asserted
the case would be appealed. Id. at 6, col. 6. As of the time of publication of this Note,
however, the appeal had not yet been filed.
19 See supra note 16; infra notes 21-63 and accompanying text.
2o See Cheever, supra note 18, at 5, col. 4 and at 38, col. 3. Two separate constitutional
grounds have been noted for opposing extension of Batson to limit a defendant's discrimina-
tory use of peremptories: impermissible interference with defendant's fifth amendment right
to counsel; and the inapplicability of the fourteenth amendment due to an absence of state
action. Id. at 38, col. 3. The fifth amendment argument is not examined in this Note; the
fourteenth amendment argument is examined extensively. See infra notes 21-45 and accom-
panying text.
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wisdom of permitting defendants to discriminate will also be ex-
amined. In this area, inquiry will focus upon whether the allowance
of discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge is antagonistic
to the values peremptories are purported to serve, and if so,
whether use of peremptories may feasibly be limited to non-dis-
criminatory usage without abrogating their legitimate role in en-
suring jury impartiality. Finally, this Note will argue that there is a
conflict between the discriminatory use of peremptories and the
rationale advanced in support of that use, and propose that due to
the confluence of the uncertain efficacy of the peremptory chal-
lenge when exercised discriminatorily, and the strength of counter-
vailing policy concerns, discriminatory use of the challenge be lim-
ited, if not by the courts, then by statute.
THE REQUIREMENT OF STATE ACTION
In Batson, the Supreme Court held violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, a prosecutor's dis-
criminatory use of the peremptory challenge.2' Extension of the
Batson rationale to defendants is problematic, however, because
the fourteenth amendment demands that the denial of equal pro-
tection involved be a product of "state action. '22 Although the
Court in Batson had no difficulty in properly invoking the four-
21 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. In Batson, the trial judge had flatly rejected the defend-
ant's timely objection to the prosecutor's discriminatory exclusions. See id. at 100. The Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded, with instructions to reverse petitioner's conviction if
the prosecutor was unable to provide a neutral explanation for his actions. See id.
22 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (Equal Protection
Clause inapplicable as private club not a state actor by virtue of its being granted state
liquor license); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961) (operation
of fourteenth amendment implicated by discriminatory practices of restaurant leasing space
from municipality within public parking facility); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)
(judicial enforcement of privately enacted, racially restrictive covenants constituted state
action for purposes of fourteenth amendment). The state action requirement was first enun-
ciated by the Court in 1883. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Writing for the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley stated that "[iut is State action of a particu-
lar character that is prohibited [by the fourteenth amendment]. Individual invasion of indi-
vidual rights is not [its concern.]" Id. at 11.
The benefits of the state action requirement, and the implications of it for the courts,
have been explained as follows:
[T]he 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limit-
ing the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on
the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot
be fairly blamed .... [It thus] require[s] the courts to respect the limits of their
own power as directed against state governments and private interests.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
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teenth amendment, 3 the state action implicated in a defendant's
discriminatory use of peremptories is much more attenuated. 4 In-
deed, until the 1940's, when the scope of the state action doctrine
was first broadened, an assertion of state action in such a case
would no doubt have been summarily rejected.25 Since that time,
however, the requirement has been liberalized, the change being
predicated upon two separate analytical frameworks: "public func-
tion" analysis; and "nexus" analysis.2"
Public Function Analysis
Public function analysis is premised on the idea that govern-
ment cannot free itself from constitutionally-imposed limitations
by delegating that authority which is "clearly governmental in na-
ture" to private individuals.27 Initially, the public function doctrine
was employed to find state action in disputes involving the at-
22 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-85. In fact, no issue regarding satisfaction of the state
action requirement was even raised, it being well established that a prosecutor is a state
actor. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (prosecutors immune from
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even when acting "under color of state law"); McCray v.
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984) (contention that systematic exclusion of identifi-
able groups by prosecutor not state action rejected on grounds prosecutor is agent of state),
reh'g denied, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1097
(1986) (mem.).
24 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice
Marshall called for the complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge. Id. at 107 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). Moreover, he would accomplish this end "by banning the use of pe-
remptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant's
peremptory as well." Id. at 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall thus implic-
itly recognized the distinction between the defendant's and the prosecutor's discriminatory
use of the peremptory challenge, and intimated he would find no state action in such use by
the defendant. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
25 Compare Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (court decree enforcing racially
restrictive covenants does not constitute governmental action) with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) (judicially enforced, privately enacted, racially restrictive covenants come
under umbrella of state action).
" See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1-3, at 425, 426,
432 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. It has been noted that the Court's
rejection of a strict interpretation of the state action requirement has not weakened judicial
support for the principle, arising from the Civil Rights Cases, that "the state and not the
private individual is the addressee of the fourteenth amendment." See Lewis, The Meaning
of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1083, 1085 (1960).
27 See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968); see also New York City Jaycees,
Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1975) (no state action in
performance of civic functions by non-profit organization); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
26, § 12.2, at 426 (activities traditionally associated with and performed by government
when performed by private parties may be deemed public functions); infra notes 29-33 and
accompanying text.
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tempted derogation of the voting rights of blacks by means of pri-
vately-controlled white primaries. 2s Subsequently, the Supreme
Court in Marsh v. Alabama's decided that activities permitted
under the first amendment could no more be infringed on the
streets of a company-owned town than on the streets of "any other
American town." 30 Exclusivity has been noted as the common ele-
ment between these two applications: the streets in Marsh were
the only streets, and the primary elections in the White Primary
cases were the only significant elections. 1 In addition to exclusiv-
ity, the requirement that the activity of the private actor be one
"traditionally and historically associated with sovereignty" has also
often been noted by the Court.32 These factors, it is submitted,
point toward the conclusion that the public function doctrine
should not be applied to state action when a defendant has exer-
cised his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. Gov-
ernment has traditionally and exclusively determined eligibility re-
quirements for jurors;33 however, it cannot correctly be asserted
28 See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (ra-
cially discriminatory practices by association of white voters state action); Smith v. Allw-
right, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944) (primary elections public function subject to constitutional
limitations); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (state statute authorizing Executive
Committee of political party to prescribe members qualifications implicates state when such
authority exercised in discriminatory manner). The Smith Court noted expressly "that state
delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation
of a state function that may make the party's action the action of the State." Smith, 321
U.S. at 660. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 26, § 12.2, at 426-27 (discussing
case law).
29 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
30 Id. at 502, 508-09. In Marsh, the Court found state action based on the fact the state
allowed private ownership of land and property which placed those functions and activities
which would normally be performed by the government in the hands of a corporation. Id.
22 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978). Although the exclusivity
requirement has been attacked, see id. at 172-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it has also been
cited approvingly by the Court and now seems firmly established. See, e.g., San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (1987) (na-
tionwide coordination of amateur athletics by corporation chartered by Congress private
action); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (no state action involved in discharge
and transfer of nursing home patients as nursing home operation not traditionally exclusive
state function); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (private school education
not public function implicating fourteenth amendment because education not "exclusive
province of the State"); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 26, § 12.2, at 430-31 (dis-
cussing Court's adherence to and application of exclusivity requirement).
2 See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 171-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966).
32 See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 85-109 (juror eligibility requirements
imposed by government). Some current requirements for jurors in various jurisdictions in-
clude being a taxpayer, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070 (1987), not being a pauper, W. VA.
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that the acceptance and rejection of jurors during voir dire has
ever been, in fact or in theory, an exclusive function of the state. 4
Indeed, there is good reason such an arrogation of authority has
never been successfully advanced, 35 for it would go far toward un-
dermining the jury's most important institutional characteristic, its
independence.3 6
Nexus Analysis: Establishing the Link Between the
Discriminatory Act and the State
Absent a finding of public function, acts of a private individ-
ual are attributable to the state only if there is "a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action" so that such
action "may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. '3 7 The
vagueness of this standard is purposeful: the Supreme Court has
stated expressly that it has never formulated "an infallible test" as
to what constitutes a sufficiently close nexus because it is only by
weighing all of the relevant facts and circumstances that a proper
determination may be made. 8 Prediction in this area is therefore
CODE § 52-1-2 (1981), and not having been convicted of adultery. See Beasley v. State, 39
Ala. App. 182, 96 So. 2d 693 (1957) (interpreting title 30 of AL& CODE (1940)).
U See People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290, 297-98, 506 N.E.2d 901, 905, 514 N.Y.S.2d 191,
195 (1987). The court in Buford Itated that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a
"jury chosen according to law, in whose selection [the defendant] has had a voice." Id.
(quoting People v. Ivery, 96 App. Div. 2d 712, 712, 465 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (4th Dep't 1983)
(mem.)). The distinction between the establishment of jurors' qualifications and the selec-
tion of particular jurors for a particular trial was noted by the New York Court of Appeals
in 1886: "The law prescribes the qualifications of jurors. The court cannot add to, or detract
from them. It cannot itself select the jury, directly or indirectly." Hildreth v. City of Troy,
101 N.Y. 234, 239, 4 N.E. 559, 562 (1886).
35 See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 147; supra note 4. It was precisely to prohibit such
a system of sole governmental selection of jurors that Parliament passed the Ordinance for
Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, ch. 2, stat. 4 (1305). See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 147.
11 J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 5. "[I]f the jury is to play its intended role as an
impartial fact-finder, expressing the community's decision, it must be independent. Other-
wise, it is not really the community's voice but the voice of the crown (or state), and the
entire rationale for using a jury is erased." Id.
'7 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). See also Junior
Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir.) (private or-
ganization receiving federal grants and substantial tax benefits by itself does not create suf-
ficient nexus to implicate fourteenth amendment), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
38 See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967). See also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-
51 (whether heavily-regulated private utility company was state actor requires "detailed in-
quiry"); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (determination of state
action "frequently admits of no easy answer"); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (finding of state action in ostensibly private discriminatory acts by
restaurant owner required investigation into particular facts and circumstances).
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unusually unreliable; nonetheless, it is submitted that, regarding a
defendant's discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, the
nexus test provides no more sufficient a rationale for finding state
action than did the public function analysis.
Indeed, an examination of analogous cases suggests a contrary
holding would require an unprecedented expansion of the state ac-
tion doctrine.3" Recently, for example, in holding a corporation
chartered by Congress was not an agent of the state, the Supreme
Court stated that absent coercion or significant encouragement
from the government, a private individual's actions would not be
held to constitute state action.40 Thus, while the discriminatory ex-
The Court's most detailed explanation of its approach to the question of state action
was provided by Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1981). In Lugar, Justice White,
writing for the Court, noted that the Court utilizes a "two-part approach" in resolving issues
involving the existence of state action:
[T]he conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly
attributable to the State.... First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise
of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Second, the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted to-
gether with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his con-
duct is otherwise chargeable to the State ....
Although related, these two principles are not the same .... The two princi-
ples diverge when the constitutional claim is directed against a party without such
apparent authority, i.e., against a private party.
Id. at 937.
Applying the Lugar framework, it is conceded that the state did create the right to
challenge peremptorily, and that right when discriminatorily exercised does result in the
deprivation of a right guaranteed by the federal government to the discriminated-against
jurors. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1970). It is submitted, however,
that the requirements of the second part of the Lugar approach are not satisfied by the
discriminatory act of a defendant acting contrary to the will of the state, for such action by
the defendant is not properly "chargeable to the state."
19 See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. But see Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 295-99 (1968) (defendant's discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge "may" constitute state action).
40 See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct.
2971, 2986 (1987). In support of this proposition, Justice Powell cited, among other cases,
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166
(1978); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357; and Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 173. San Francisco
Arts, 107 S. Ct. at 2986. Justice Powell quoted with approval the Blum Court's assertion
that a state "normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exer-
cised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement ... that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the [government]." Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at
1004). It is suggested the word "normally" in the preceding sentence is merely a reference to
those cases decided under a public function analysis, and does not imply the Court might
ever consider a less substantial nexus than usual sufficient to constitute state action.
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ercise of state trespass laws by store owners might properly be at-
tributable to the state when the state had expressly assured the
store owners it would enforce discriminatory usage,4 ' enforcement
of that same law would not be considered state action if the store
owners had called upon police for enforcement absent any official
action tantamount to an encouragement of private discrimi-
nation.42
Applying this reasoning to the defendant's discriminatory ex-
ercise of peremptories, it is suggested that although allowing such
exercise of the peremptory challenge creates an opportunity for
discrimination, the state cannot reasonably be viewed as encourag-
ing the same since the discriminatory action is typically performed
independently from, indeed, in opposition to,43 any express or im-
plied direction by the state. The most appropriate comparison
might be to a claim that the state has acted by allowing a voter to
vote for or against a candidate on expressly racial grounds." Al-
though both situations involve structures erected and maintained
by the state, the uncoerced and unencouraged discriminatory exer-
cise of each right is simply insufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the nexus analysis, for in neither case can the private actor's
action be "fairly [attributed] to the state. '45
41 See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 268-73 (1963); see also Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (state constitution prohibiting state interference in private-sec-
tor real property transactions deemed state promotion of racial discrimination); Anderson v.
Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-04 (1964) (statute requiring candidate's race be noted on ballot
unconstitutional state promotion of discrimination).
42 See Walker v. State, 220 Ga. 415, 419-20, 139 S.E.2d 278, 282 (1964), rev'd on other
grounds, 381 U.S. 355 (1965) (per curiam). In Walker, the Supreme Court of Georgia distin-
guished Lombard by noting that the state had resolved in this instance to urge its citizens
not to discriminate. Id. at 418-19, 139 S.E.2d at 281-82.
The Supreme Court's reversal was founded upon its holding in Hanem v. City of Rock
Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). See Walker, 381 U.S. at 355. Hamm had abated a similar trespass
conviction based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Hamm, 379 U.S. at 308. Thus, as the
Court in Hamm expressly noted, the question of the fourteenth amendment's applicability
was not addressed "in any manner." Hamm, 379 U.S. at 310 n.3.
43 Cf. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (public defender not acting
under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a defense lawyer "opposes
... the State").
4' It might be maintained the concreteness of the harm to the particular juror involved
makes the analogy inapposite. It is suggested, however, the correspondingly greater stake of
the defendant being prosecuted vitiates any distinction upon these grounds.
41 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). See also Blum v. Yaret-
sky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (state's mere acquiescence in private parties' transfer of
nursing home patients does not create sufficient nexus to invoke fourteenth amendment).
The fact that during voir dire a defense attorney acts as an "officer of the court" does
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RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL JURY AS GROUNDS FOR LIMITING DEFENDANT'S
DISCRIMINATORY USE
Various state courts, based upon the respective state versions
of the sixth amendment guarantee to an impartial jury, have lim-
ited the criminal defendant's ability to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges discriminatorily." These decisions are founded upon the be-
lief that the state, no less than the defendant, is entitled to an
impartial jury.47 The discriminatory use of the peremptory chal-
lenge, it is maintained, by skewing the representative nature of the
jury, impermissibly impinges upon this right.4" While independent
state grounds insulate these decisions from the Supreme Court's
purview,49 a question arises as to whether the Supreme Court
might follow the lead of these states and hold that, in the federal
court system, a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges similarly violates a right of the federal government to an
impartial jury.50 Despite supportive dicta to the contrary,5' it is
submitted that such a holding by the Court would be both consti-
tutionally and logically untenable.
The sixth amendment, for example, grants "the accused ...
not change the legal analogousness of the two situations noted above; indeed, in other con-
texts, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the contention that by so acting an attorney
becomes a state actor "under color of state law." See Polk County, 454 U.S. at 318; supra
note 43. See also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973) (attorneys not government officials
by virtue of being officers of court); Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956)
(lawyers not officers of court for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (1982)).
"' See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 906 n.29 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 254-56, 424 N.E.2d 495, 499-501 (1981). See also People v. Pagel, 186
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 7-8, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1986) (applying Wheeler principle to
defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1953
(1987).
47 See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 282 n.29, P.2d at 761-62, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 902-03, 906 n.29; State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488, 489-90 n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16, 517 n.35, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 881 (1979).
'" See supra note 47.
" See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1331-67 (1982) (discussing extent of independence of
state courts in interpreting state constitutions).
50 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 n.4 (1986). The defendant in Batson
based his claim upon an alleged violation of sixth amendment rights. See id. The Court, in
deciding the case under equal protection principles, explicitly noted it was expressing "no
view on the merits of... Sixth Amendment arguments." Id.
" See id. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)).
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the right to... an impartial jury."52 Although this language alone
does not preclude a finding that the state too is entitled to such a
right,53 it is suggested that such language does add considerable
weight to the already compelling historical data supporting the
constitutional validity of allowing the state to be treated less favor-
ably than the criminal defendant. Such historical support includes
recognition at common law that the right to challenge peremptorily
is designed primarily to benefit the defendant;" state statutes that
make available a greater number of peremptories to defendants
than prosecutors; 55 and the fact that although Congress granted
defendants the right to exercise peremptory challenges in 1790,58
prosecutors in federal courts were not granted any similar right un-
til 1865.57 The incompatibility of interpreting as restrictive of a
defendant's rights a constitutional guarantee unquestionably
designed to protect and enhance those rights further suggests the
benefits of the Constitution's impartial jury guarantee might prop-
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Article III is thought to have incorporated within its terms
most of the rights later expressly guaranteed by the sixth amendment. THE CONSTrrurION OF
THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA (ANNOTATED), S. Doc. No. 232, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 501-02
(1938). Thus, it is submitted, the claimed constitutional right of the state to an impartial
jury upon the same terms as that granted to defendants need not necessarily be found in the
sixth amendment, for Article III could provide the same result, as could the common law.
See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (Marshall, C.J.)
("impartial jury... required by the common law"). Except for the express limitation of the
rights of the sixth amendment to "the accused," however, all the arguments against finding
a state right in the sixth amendment can also be mustered against finding either an Article
HI or common-law basis.
' See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice
Goldberg quoted Blackstone's characterization of the peremptory challenge as "a provision
full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly
famous." Id. See also supra note 4 (delineating historical differences in treatment of prose-
cutor's and defendant's right to peremptorily challenge).
11 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 59-805 (Harrison 1986) (state allowed one-half number of
peremptory challenges allocated to defendant); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 768.13 (West
1982) (upon trial for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment defendant entitled to
20 peremptory challenges and state 15); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:78-7 (West Supp. 1987) (upon
trial for serious crimes of violence defendant entitled to 20 peremptory challenges and state
12). Currently, seventeen states grant the defendant more peremptory challenges than the
prosecution in capital cases, ten grant the defendant more peremptories in non-capital fel-
ony trials, and five provide the defendant a greater number of peremptories in misdemeanor
trials. See Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at 228-30.
In federal criminal trials the number of peremptory challenges allowed each side is
equal, except in trials for non-capital felonies, in which the defendant is granted the right to
exercise ten peremptory challenges and the government only six. See FED. R. CRIa P. 24(b).
56 1 Stat. 119, ch. 30 (1790).
'7 13 Stat. 500, ch. 86, § 2 (1865).
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erly be limited to the defendant.5 8
Moreover, whatever the degree of solicitude that should be ac-
corded a defendant beyond the constitutionally required mini-
mum, a limitation upon the manner of each side's exercise of its
available peremptory challenges cannot be distinguished on any
principled constitutional basis from a prosecutor's demand for an
equal number of peremptory challenges. 9 Thus, it is asserted the
logical inconsistency between invalidating on the basis of the
state's right to an impartial jury the defendant's discriminatory
use of the peremptory challenge, while retaining the constitution-
ally unquestioned and more significant disparity of inequality in
the number of peremptories allowed, 0 suggests that the issue is
not one of constitutional dimensions and is left most wisely to
Congress and the respective state legislatures. 61 While legislative
bodies may act to ensure that the state's rights are equal to those
enjoyed by the defendant, 2 they are also free, as a policy matter,
to grant the defendant increased rights in relation to the state.6
58 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 31 (1965). In Singer, the Court noted the trial by jury guarantee of Article III "was
clearly intended to protect the accused from oppression by the Government." Singer, 380
U.S. at 31.
59 In fact, it is suggested that numerical inequality is more injurious to the state's al-
leged right to an impartial jury than differing restrictions upon the exercise of peremptories
might be, since as a practical matter the former disparity will almost always affect the jury's
composition. Differing restrictions, in contrast, can be expected to impact upon the compo-
sition of the jury in only a small percentage of trials. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113,
1132 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and re-
manded, 471 U.S. 1097 (1986) (mem.).
60 See supra note 59 (explaining why inequality in numbers is more significant).
6' Cf. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 6, at 376-77. Professor Saltzburg and Ms. Powers
suggest a constitutional solution to the problems raised by allowance of differing numbers of
peremptory challenges is unwise because it would freeze into law a particular means of
achieving impartiality-an end which can be reached only by maintaining maximum flexi-
bility as to means. Id.
82 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4503 (Supp. 1986); Anderson, DA, Lawmakers Ask
Action on Bill For Jury Challenges, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 2. Regarding the effect
of the sixth amendment on the rights of the state in a criminal prosecution, it has been
noted:
Although the sixth amendment protects only the defendant, there is nothing in its
language, and certainly nothing in its history, to suggest that the state may not
protect itself from jurors who are partial to the defense. The amendment [simply]
assures that ... if the state is willing to tolerate biased jurors, the defendant need
not.
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 6, at 354.
11 See supra note 55. For example, in criminal cases, it is not constitutionally required
that the prosecutor carry the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). Yet, the trend in recent years has been to require the prose-
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SHOULD THE DEFENDANT'S USE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
BE LIMITED AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY?
Peremptory challenges are favored to the extent they ensure
impartiality in, and provide legitimacy for, the judicial decision-
making process. 4 In deciding whether to limit their use, a two-step
analysis is required.15 Initially, it must be determined that the pro-
posed limitation will not adversely affect impartiality and legiti-
macy.6 It must then be shown that implementation of the limita-
cutor to do exactly this. Id. at 208 n.10 Thus, legislatures placing the burden of proving
affirmative defenses on the state have made a policy decision to treat the state as prosecutor
with less favor than is constitutionally mandated, just as, it is submitted, a legislature could
decide to grant a defendant more peremptory challenges than are available to the state, and
just as a legislature could grant each party the right to exercise its challenges with complete
freedom, subject only to constitutional limitations, even if the limitations placed upon each
side's use were not identical.
I See supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text. The consequences of a criminal justice
system's failure to attain legitimacy among the public due to perceived discrimination in
jury selection procedures are severe:
To the disfavored minority, the law ... seems unjustly harsh .... To the extent
that there is imbalance on juries, then, the underrepresented group will less read-
ily accept their decisions and will rarely feel the ameliorating effect which is one
of the supposed advantages of the jury system.
Another primary objective of the jury system is to increase confidence in and
support for the law-enforcement process.... Selection which is or even appears to
be discriminatory.., destroys confidence and support among those against whom
the discrimination seems aimed. And, seeing justice manipulated in their favor,
the dominant group itself may suffer a breakdown in morality and an increase in
lawlessness.
Kuhn, supra note 39, at 246.
Thus, while the defendant's perception of what is just is important, see supra note 8,
protection of that interest should be measured against and limited by due regard for the
wider interests of the community. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Signifi-
cantly, these community interests are harmed equally, regardless of whether the source of
the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge is the defendant or the state. See People
v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906 n.29
(1978).
" See infra notes 66 & 67 and accompanying text.
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 125-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger ar-
gued against placing any limitations on the arbitrary use of the peremptory challenge pre-
cisely because he believed it would further neither the ends nor the appearance of justice:
[T]oday's holding, while purporting to "further the ends of justice," will not have
that effect.... The effect.., will be to .... produce juries that the parties do not
believe are truly impartial. This ... will diminish confidence in the jury system.
[Indeed, t]oday... the Court accepts a positive evil for a perceived one.
Id. at 128-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Rehnquist agreed, and additionally asserted that the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges "may be extremely useful in eliminating from the jury persons who
might be biased in one way or another." Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally
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tion is practicable; that it will not restrict beneficial use of
peremptories or otherwise detrimentally affect the judicial sys-
tem. 7 If both aspects of the analysis are satisfied, and it is here
suggested they are, the proposed limitation should be accepted.
The Impact upon Impartiality and the Perception of Legitimacy
Regarding jury impartiality, the central issue initially resolves
itself into whether one accepts or rejects the concept of "diffused
impartiality," the idea that true impartiality can be achieved only
through the interactions of a representative grouping of necessarily
biased jurors.6 8 If this idea is accepted, and one believes the state
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 6, at 353-75 (objecting to restricting use of peremptory
challenges on grounds that impartiality will suffer in fact and in appearance).
The majority in Batson considered these concerns as well, but reached contrary conclu-
sions, with Justice Powell contending the prohibition of a prosecutor's discriminatory use
would further "the ends of justice" and increase "public respect for our criminal justice
system and the rule of law." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
11 See id. at 98-99. In Batson, both the opinion of the Court and Chief Justice Burger's
dissent considered the practical effect of limiting discriminatory use of the peremptory chal-
lenge. The Court stated that jurisdictions which have applied a version of the restriction set
forth in Batson have experienced neither administrative problems nor a hindrance of non-
discriminatory usage of the challenge. Id. Chief Justice Burger, in contrast, contended the
majority's opinion was founded less on reason than upon the urge to achieve "utopian bliss,"
id. at 131 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and argued the most likely result of the Court's ruling
would be to "force 'the peremptory challenge [to] collapse into the challenge for cause.'" Id.
at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir.
1984)). Concurring, Justice White acknowledged the existence of uncertainties as to both
the application and effect of the Court's ruling, but stated that despite such uncertainties,
"the time has come [for the Court] to rule as it has." Id. at 102 (White, J., concurring). See
also United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984) (inquiry into basis for peremp-
tory challenges would lengthen already overly long criminal trials).
68 See Commonwealth v. Soares, 371 Mass. 461, 484-88, 387 N.E.2d 499, 512-15, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). The term "diffused impartiality," which apparently originated
in a dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter, Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946), has been explained as follows:
[D]iversity of opinion among individuals... is envisioned when we refer to "dif-
fused impartiality." No human being is wholly free of the interests and prefer-
ences which are the product of his cultural, family, and community experience.
Nowhere is the dynamic commingling of the ideas and biases of such individuals
more essential than inside the jury room.
Soares, 371 Mass. at 486-87, 387 N.E.2d at 515. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503
(1972). The Court in Peters stated that "[w]hen any large and identifiable segment of the
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room quali-
ties of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable." Id. at 503.
Although commentators have generally approved of the concept as legitimate, see
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 6, at 353, acceptance of it is by no means universal. See
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 292, 583 P.2d 748, 771, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 913 (1978)
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should have a jury equally as impartial to it as to the defendant,
the logic of limiting both parties' discriminatory usage becomes ob-
vious.6 9 It is submitted, however, that such acceptance should not
be viewed as a prerequisite to legislative adoption of a prohibition
against all discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Even if
critics of diffused impartiality are correct and the perceived injus-
tices caused by imbalanced juries have no foundation in fact, the
harm to the community caused by the perception itself is no less
real for being based largely upon a faulty premise.70 By eliminating
discriminatorily used peremptory challenges, legislatures could
eliminate the very real harm that emanates from such use.7 1 Any
consequent dangers to the legitimate rights of the defendant could
be averted by expanding voir dire and maintaining the require-
ment of jury unanimity.72
(Richardson, J., dissenting); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1159-60 (Colo. 1987) (Vollack,
J., specially concurring in result only). Justice Richardson stated in Wheeler that
"[d]issension ... is no guarantee whatever of impartiality. Impartiality is not assured by
balancing 'biases.' Quite the opposite." Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 292, 583 P.2d at 771, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 913 (1978) (Richardson, J., dissenting). In Fields, Justice Vollack agreed, adding
that he could not "endorse the adoption of [the diffused impartiality] analysis... because it
would carry the divisive implication that without such a system of proportional representa-
tion, juries would be unable to be impartial." Fields, 732 P.2d at 1160 (Vollack, J., specially
concurring in result only). See generally Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra
note 3, at 246-48 (jurors' innate diversity essential to production of impartial jury).
'9 See cases cited supra note 17 (indicating when both propositions accepted by court,
restriction of peremptory challenge inevitable result).
70 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("[c]ommunity participation in the
administration of the criminal law.. is ... critical to public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system"). Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (judge serving as
"one-man grand jury" could not try and convict witnesses of contempt for statements made
during those same grand jury proceedings). In Murchison, Justice Black's majority opinion
noted that:
[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome....
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between
contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice."
Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
71 See generally Kuhn, supra note 39, at 244-50 (legitimacy of verdicts enhanced by
non-discriminatory selection of jurors). Even if the diffused impartiality concept is without
merit and discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge does not result in biased verdicts,
the harms resulting from such use are still considerable, both to the community as a whole,
see supra note 64, and to the groups discriminated against in particular. See Kuhn, supra
note 39, at 247.
72 See Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at 262-73. Although the
author of the preceding Note is concerned primarily with eliminating entirely the use of the
peremptory challenge, it is suggested many of the author's arguments support equally the
practicability of effectively limiting the exercise of the peremptory to instances of non-dis-
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Thus, if the diffused impartiality concept is correct, justice is
most truly served by prohibiting the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges. 73 If individual impartiality is possible, on the other
hand, justice may not benefit from additionally restricting the de-
fendant's use of such challenges, but by scrupulously maintaining
and expanding the defendant's other protections, neither will it
suffer.7 4 The only harm not remediable is the possible damage to
the legitimacy of the jury's verdict in the eyes of the defendant.7 5
It is suggested such a harm, as long as it has no basis in fact, is
outweighed by the damage to the legitimacy of the jury's verdict in
the eyes of the community, which has, after all, at least suffered
the tangible harm of the original discriminatory act. 6
The Practicability of the Limitation
Opposition to restricting the discriminatory exercise of the pe-
remptory challenge is also based upon the belief that enforcement
of any such restrictions will be administratively unworkable and
will only inexorably and inevitably lead to the peremptory chal-
lenge's complete evisceration.77 The merits of this position are
criminatory use. This Note asserts, for example, by decreasing restrictions on the types of
questions allowed during voir dire, and by eliminating exclusive judicial and en masse ques-
tioning, a defendant will not need any peremptory challenges since he will be able, because
of the increased questioning allowed, successfully to challenge for cause all biased jurors.
See id. at 268-71. Thus, restricting the manner of a defendant's use of the peremptory chal-
lenge also need not necessarily inure to his detriment. See id.
11 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The most succinct statement of this idea
was forwarded in State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984), in which the court stated "[t]he
primary purpose of peremptory challenges is to aid and assist in the selection of an impar-
tial jury.... [But discriminatory use hampers selection] of an impartial jury." Id. at 486.
74 See supra note 72.
1 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 128-29 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
76 See supra notes 64 & 71.
77 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 128-31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 221-22 (1965) (restrictions upon peremptory challenges would change nature of same);
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1140 (2d Cir. 1984) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (peremptory
challenges subject to examination ineffective jury selection tool), reh'g denied, 456 F.2d 277
(2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1097 (1986) (mem.); People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 295, 583 P.2d 748, 773, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 915 (1978) (Richardson,
J., dissenting) (prohibition upon discriminatory use of peremptory challenge will result in
excessive administrative burden). Regarding the administration of a rule limiting the dis-
criminatory use of peremptories, it has been predicted that:
Even assuming the existence of a clear theoretical rule regarding what types of
peremptory challenges are legal, enormous difficulties would arise from any at-
tempt to implement such a rule in practice. A great deal of time, effort and ex-
pense would be necessary to attempt to determine whether any given peremptory
challenge is legal. Any such determination would entail the extremely difficult
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doubtful, however, particularly since the practical experiences of
states that have adopted the limitation convincingly suggest the
feasibility of its implementation." Fears of increased costs and
prolonged trials also appear exaggerated, 9 especially since the
minimal increases associated with the limitation's implementation
are, it is suggested, a small price to pay for the elimination of a too
tempting opportunity for discrimination that has been too long tol-
erated within our courts of law.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the peremptory challenge has been thought to
satisfy the interests of both justice and the appearance of justice.
The discriminatory use of such challenges, however, serves neither
task of assessing the internal motives of the attorneys.... Most important of all,
attorneys, confronted with a rule completely or partially restricting their right to
act with the internal motive of helping their clients when making peremptory
challenges, will be under enormous pressure to He regarding their motives. Such a
rule will foster hypocrisy and disrespect for our system of justice.
King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also supra note
67.
." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 99; McCray, 750 F.2d at 1132; People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161,
169, 672 P.2d 854, 859, 197 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1983).
Every jurisdiction that has adopted a limitation on the discriminatory use of the pe-
remptory challenge has adopted a test similar to that the California Supreme Court first
established in Wheeler:.
If a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors
on the ground of group bias alone, he must raise the point in timely fashion and
...establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group ....
[Then], he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged
because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias.
If the court finds that a prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to
the other party .... [T]o sustain his burden of justification, the allegedly offend-
ing party must satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptories on grounds
that were reasonably relevant .... [W]e rely on the good judgment of the trial
courts....
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06 (footnotes
omitted).
The differences among courts in applying this test primarily concern its proper scope,
see State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984); Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges,
supra note 3, at 278-79, and the remedy to be used upon finding discrimination. See Batson,
476 U.S. at 99-100, n.24. For a recent example of a case in which a prosecutor was able to
provide a sufficient race-neutral explanation for excluding black jurors, see People v. Greg-
ory "ZZ", N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 2, col. 3 (3d Dep't).
79 See Note, Abolishing Peremptory Challenges, supra note 3, at 255-56, 272. A Massa-
chusetts Superior Court Justice has asserted that implementation of the test has not posed
any problems. See Cheever, supra note 18, at 39, col. 1.
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interest. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court should not act to pro-
hibit the practice as unconstitutional, for to do so would require
extending unduly the contours of constitutional jurisprudence.
Thus, the issue remains one within the realm of legislative compe-
tence, and the proper legislative response is to limit the exercise of
peremptory challenges to instances of non-discriminatory use. The
price of continued inaction is the loss of an opportunity to make
the jury experience a truly effective cohesive force for society,8"
and to limit the concomitant harmful effects of divisive
stereotyping.
John J. Hoefffner
80 See Tucker, Racial Discrimination In Jury Selection In Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 736,
750 (1966). Professor Tucker provided an early and eloquent elucidation of the impact of
increased jury participation upon societal cohesiveness, as he noted that:
No other institution conducted under government compulsion has the capacity for
bringing together for a common purpose adults who may be likely to represent so
many varying experiences, backgrounds, and conditions or stations in life. As
these persons labor toward their objective of finding and pronouncing their com-
munity's average judgment of the disputed facts, they will find that they are not
as different from one another as their prejudices may have led them to believe.
And they will see that the strength of their community, indeed the strength of
their state and nation, grows out of those individual differences which they will
learn to respect.
[Vol. 62:46
